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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Bruce Edward Reed appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition
for post-conviction relief. He challenges denial of two of his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Reed filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for
enticement of a child over the internet. (R., pp. 5-8, 50-62, 104-21.) Among the
claims asserted were that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
“unanimity instruction” at trial (R., pp. 59-60) and that counsel was ineffective for
not seeking further redaction of parts of the recording of Reed’s interview by
police (R., pp. 109-10).
The state moved for summary disposition of the petition. (R., pp. 18-26,
127-46.)

The district court also provided a notice of intent to dismiss.

(R., pp. 162-76.) The district court thereafter summarily dismissed the petition.
(R., pp. 178-92.) The district court concluded that Reed had failed to establish
prima facie claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking further
redaction of statements made in the police interview (R., p. 185) and not seeking
a special unanimity instruction (R., pp. 188-90).
Reed filed a notice of appeal after the district court entered its order
summarily dismissing. (R., pp. 194-96.) Although not made part of the record,
the district court entered a judgment on June 21, 2016.
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ISSUES
Reed states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Reed’s
claim that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to move to redact statements made during
a recorded interrogation that tended to implicate Mr. Reed in
prior misconduct?

2.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Reed’s
claim that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to request a unanimity instruction?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Reed failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded that
Reed had failed to make a prima facie claim of either deficient performance or
prejudice related to redaction of statements he made in the police interview?
2.
Has Reed failed to show error in the district court’s determination that a
special unanimity instruction was not required, and therefore counsel was not
ineffective for not requesting one?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Reed Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Concluded That
Reed Had Failed To Make A Prima Facie Case Of Either Deficient Performance
Or Prejudice Related To Redaction Of Statements He Made In The Police
Interview
A.

Introduction
In his petition Reed alleged as follows:
The interview video of the Defendant, as redacted by the State,
was prejudicial in that it left out portions of the interview that were
relevant to explain or qualify the context in which the statements
were made.
Specifically, Mr. Reed is very concerned about how difficult
this case will be on his family. This is because, when he was
arrested on kidnaping charges, the entire experience was very
difficult on his family. Accordingly, while being interviewed by police
about this case the officer tells Mr. Reed “I agree it hurts them
when a loved one messes up like this, but what they want is the
best for you.” (Interview Video of Mr. Reed.) Mr. Reed then
responds by telling the officer “I’ve been working hard and I try and
I love everybody.” (Interview Video of Mr. Reed.) The officer says,
“They want to see that you can change.” And Mr. Reed responds
by saying “I have changed.” (Interview Video of Mr. Reed.)
Obviously, the video played for the jury redacted the
information about Mr. Reed’s unrelated prior case. However, the
video played for the jury included Mr. Reed’s statements “I have
changed.” These statements were entirely out of context.
Accordingly, it left the jury no other choice but to put them in the
context of the trial. Specifically, that he had once engaged in
enticing children but now he has changed.
Mr. Reed had the right to have the jury hear statements that
ought to have been considered in fairness so as to portray the true
context of the statements, and not the skewed view of the
statements as depicted by the State. Trial Counsel’s performance
was deficient for failing to request that Mr. Reed’s statement “I have
changed” be redacted from the video and such deficient
performance prejudiced Mr. Reed’s right to a fair trial.

(R., p. 110.)
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The state moved to dismiss this claim.

(R., pp. 138-39.)

The state

pointed out that trial counsel had testified that he was very concerned about
redacting the discussion of the prior kidnapping charge, and that portion was
redacted.

(R., p. 139.)

Trial counsel testified that the comment, “I have

changed,” was, after the redaction, “out of context,” but that did not concern him
because the statement itself was innocuous, and he did not believe it would
concern the jury. (Id.) The state argued the claim was “bare and conclusory”
because there was “no evidence” of how the jury interpreted “these three words”
and no evidence that “these three words” affected the outcome of the trial. (Id.)
The district court summarily dismissed this claim because the “alleged
failure to place the words [“I have changed”] in context was a strategic and
tactical decision which cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief. Further,
Reed has not alleged facts which, if true, would demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had
Mr. Roark requested that other portions of the interview be played or that the
statement be redacted.” (R., p. 170.)
On appeal Reed argues the phrase “I have changed” “tends to implicate
Mr. Reed in prior, similar misconduct.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) Because of this
tendency, trial counsel was deficient for failing to move to have it redacted and
Reed was prejudiced because, had the phrase been redacted, “the outcome of
the trial would have been different.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-14.) Application of
the correct legal standards to the record in this case shows that the district court
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properly concluded that Reed had failed to present a prima facie claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same

standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s
admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to
relief.” Payne v. State, 159 Idaho 879, ___, 367 P.3d 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2016).
C.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Reed’s Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel For Not Moving To Further Redact The Interview
Recording
“To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner

seeking post-conviction relief must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency.” Severson v.
State, 159 Idaho 517, 520, 363 P.3d 358, 361 (2015). “To establish deficient
performance, ‘the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.’

To demonstrate prejudice, ‘[t]he

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 417–18, 348 P.3d 1, 32–33 (2015) (citations
omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984)). Not
objecting to evidence falls within the area of tactical or strategic decisions. See
Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 500, 348 P.3d at 115. “Strategic and tactical decisions
will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a
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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective review.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Summary judgment is proper “if it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Payne,
159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 277. In doing so, “the district court is free to arrive
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence.” Id.
In relation to the “I have changed” statement, trial counsel testified: “‘I
don’t think it raised any concerns with the jury. It didn’t with me. It could have
referred to all sorts of things. I don’t know anyone who would claim they haven’t
changed. So, I don’t—no, I wasn’t concerned with it. I still wouldn’t be.’”
(R., p. 139 (quoting deposition of trial counsel).)

This testimony is

uncontroverted. The district court’s determination that the lack of an objection
was a tactical decision not to be second-guessed was correct.
Reed argues the district court’s conclusion that the decision to not object
was a tactical decision “was in error” because whether trial counsel “did not see
any problems” is “irrelevant.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)

Reed claims “the

question is whether the jury would have construed the statement negatively.”
(Id.) Reed cites no law for his argument that all he need demonstrate to prove
deficient performance is that the evidence was subject to objection, or that
different counsel might view the evidence in different ways. To the contrary, “a
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trial attorney’s failure to object to inadmissible evidence or other potential errors
may be done for legitimate strategic or tactical purposes.”

Mintun v. State,

144 Idaho 656, 662, 168 P.3d 40, 46 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Pratt v. State,
134 Idaho 581, 584 n.1, 6 P.3d 831, 834 n.1. (2000)). The relevant question is
whether “the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.”
Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 500, 348 P.3d at 115.

Because no such objective

shortcomings are suggested by the evidence or argued on appeal, current
counsel’s mere disagreement with prior counsel’s assessment of the likely effect
of the evidence on the trial is insufficient to show error by the district court.
The district court also found a lack of prejudice because “Reed has not
alleged facts which, if true, would demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different had Mr. Roark requested that
other portions of the interview be played or that the statement be redacted.”
(R,. p. 170.) The district court properly concluded that Reed had failed to allege
and present evidence supporting a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Reed claims that he presented evidence of prejudice. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 13-14.) First, he references trial counsel’s testimony that the trial judge told
him, “I thought you had that case won.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 13 (citing

R., p. 153).) There is no evidence that this comment had anything to do with the
evidence of Reed’s statement that he had changed that trial counsel allegedly
should have moved to exclude. Second, he points out that he testified that he
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did not believe he was communicating with a minor and made no attempts to
meet the person he was communicating with.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.)

Again, there is no attempt to relate this to the evidence of Reed’s statements that
he had changed. As stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals, “there was abundant
evidence of sexually explicit ‘instant messaging’ communication between [Reed]
and ‘borahjenny.’” State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 122, 294 P.3d 1132, 1134
(Ct. App. 2012). Moreover, the applicable law did “not include, as an element,
any acts other than use of Internet communications to ‘solicit, seduce, lure,
persuade or entice’ one who is, or is believed to be, a minor under age sixteen
for a sexual act.” Id. at 123, 294 P.3d at 1135. Reed’s argument that the jury
interpreted the “abundant evidence of sexually explicit ‘instant messaging’” with
an apparent minor against him only because of the “I have changed” comment is
base speculation.
The district court properly concluded Reed presented no evidence that
trial counsel was deficient because he concluded that the “I have changed”
comment in the police interview was likely not significant to the case and
therefore did not move to exclude it from evidence.

The district court also

properly concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial hung on that evidence. Reed has failed to show any error in the district
court’s summary disposition.
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II.
Reed Has Failed To Show That The District Court’s Determination That A
Special Unanimity Instruction Was Not Required Was Error
A.

Introduction
Reed claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a special

unanimity instruction. (R., pp. 114-15.) He alleged: “Trial Counsel failed to ask
the district court to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on which of
the alleged chats constituted the alleged enticement.” (R., p. 115.) The district
court dismissed this claim. (R., pp. 173-75.) The district court reasoned as
follows:
Here, the evidence presented against Reed consisted of dozens of
internet chats over a five month span. The chats begin relatively
innocently, with Reed stating he needed a “movie partner” and
asking borahjenny to “come make [him] dinner.” The chats
progressively get more sexual in nature as time goes on, with Reed
commenting that he is “horny” and how he could “sex [her] up real
good.” He states on several occasions that he’d like borahjenny to
“come over.” There is not, however, any single chat which would
alone satisfy the elements of l.C. § 18-1509A. He never directs
borahjenny to go to a specific address at a specific time so he can
perform sexual acts with her. Rather, as the State explained to the
jury in closing, the chats, taken collectively, give rise to a single act
of solicitation and, in this sense, represent a continuing course of
conduct. In this regard, the circumstances are distinct from those in
Miller where each incident of sexual contact could independently
support a conviction for the crime charged. That does not exist
here. Consequently, because Reed’s conduct constituted a single
offense, a specific unanimity instruction was not warranted.
(R., pp. 174-75 (brackets original, citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 16 P.3d
937 (Ct. App. 2000)).) The district court also concluded that, even if counsel
could have asked for and received a “special unanimity” instruction there was no
prejudice, in part because the jury clearly rejected Reed’s defense that he knew
he was not chatting with a child. (R., p. 175.)
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On appeal Reed argues he was entitled to the instruction “because he
allegedly committed several acts, each of which could independently support a
conviction for the charged offense of enticing a minor over the internet.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)

Specifically, he posits that “each online

communication that references a sexual act” is a separate crime of enticement.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 17.) In relation to prejudice, he argues that it is “highly
unlikely that all jurors agreed upon the same singular act of the fourteen
separately alleged acts upon which it could have based its verdict.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 18.) His arguments fail because (1) he was not entitled to a “special
unanimity instruction,” (2) his claim that the statute made any online reference to
a sexual act a crime is meritless, and (3) whether the jurors in fact agreed on
which one of 14 chats constituted the crime is irrelevant under the applicable
legal standards. Review of the applicable law and record shows he has failed to
show that the district court erred.
B.

Standard Of Review
The relevant standard of review is set forth on page 5, supra.

C.

Reed Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Analysis
The relevant legal standards applicable to claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel and summary dismissal of post-conviction claims are set forth on
pages 5-6, supra. As pertaining to this claim, it is neither deficient performance
nor prejudicial for counsel to not request an instruction that would not have been
given.

See Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67-68, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172-73
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(Ct. App. 2011) (where a post-conviction petitioner alleges trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion, “a conclusion that the motion, if pursued,
would not have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both
prongs of the Strickland test”).
The jury was instructed that its verdict must be unanimous. (R., p. 173.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[a]n instruction that the jury must
unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense . . . is generally not
required.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417, 446 (2012)
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711, 215 P.3d
414, 431 (2009)).

The exception to this general rule is when a defendant

commits different criminal acts, each of which constitute “separate incidents
involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reas.”

Id. at 475, 272 P.3d at

447. Thus, for example, in Severson, the Court held that the defendant, who was
charged with murder by poisoning and/or suffocation, or both, was not entitled to
a special unanimity instruction “[a]bsent evidence of more than one instance in
which Severson engaged in the charged conduct.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 712,
215 P.3d at 432; see also State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912,
919 (2008) (defendant not entitled to a unanimity instruction because “only one
criminal act was charged – first-degree murder – and there was no evidence
presented of additional criminal acts”).
The criminal act at issue was the use of the internet to “solicit, seduce,
lure, persuade or entice by words or actions, or both, a minor child under the age
of sixteen (16) years or a person the defendant believes to be a minor child
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under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in any sexual act with or against
the child.” I.C. § 18-1509A(1) (2009). In this case the state’s theory was that the
conversations in their entirety were an ongoing attempt by Reed to get a person
he believed was a minor to engage in sexual activity with him. (R., pp. 174-75.)
The evidence showed the conversations started rather innocuously, but grew
ever more sexually explicit.

(Id.)

Like grooming behavior or an ongoing

negotiation, the entire course of the discussion was the solicitation, seduction,
lure, persuasion or enticement to a sexual act. Because each conversation was
part of an ongoing prohibited act, the district court correctly concluded that Reed
was not entitled to a special unanimity instruction, and therefore he had failed to
present a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Reed contends that because conversations were held on different days,
there were different unions of intent and action. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)
His contention that “each online communication that references a sexual act” is
necessarily a separate offense (Appellant’s brief, p. 17) does not withstand
analysis. Because the offense is in the nature of a solicitation to engage in a
sexual relationship, the ongoing on-line cultivation of the relationship was
properly viewed by the state and presented to the jury as a single union of act
and intent rather than multiple unions of different acts with different intents on
different days. (R., pp. 173-75.)
Moreover, given the “abundant evidence of sexually explicit ‘instant
messaging’ communication between [Reed] and ‘borahjenny,’” Reed, 154 Idaho
at 122, 294 P.3d at 1134, and the rejection of Reed’s defense that he knew he
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was not addressing an actual underage female (R., p. 175), there was no
evidence of prejudice. There is simply no reason to believe that if the jury were
instructed that it had to agree that one of the conversations in which Reed
became sexually explicit constituted the crime there was a reasonable chance
the jury would have acquitted.
Reed argues it is “highly unlikely that all jurors agreed upon the same
singular act” and that it is “likely some of the jurors could have concluded” that
some of the conversations were not enough alone to convict. (Appellant’s brief,
p. 18.) The relevant standard is not, however, whether the jury in fact made the
findings a special unanimity instruction would have required or whether the jury
would have been unanimous every one of the sex-oriented conversations
independently constituted the charged crime. “The defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho
386, 417–18, 348 P.3d 1, 32–33 (2015) (citations, brackets and internal
quotations omitted).

There is no reason to believe, much less evidence to

demonstrate, that a jury, with the abundant evidence presented at trial and who
had rejected the defense provided, would have acquitted Reed if presented with
a “special unanimity” instruction.
The district court correctly concluded that Reed had not presented a prima
facie claim of deficient performance or prejudice.
analysis shows Reed has failed to show error.
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Application of the correct

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2016.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of September, 2016, served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing
an electronic copy to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
INTERIM STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KKJ/dd

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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